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European car manufacturers’ latest crisis is only one part of
the industry’s two-decades of restructuring and decline.
by Blog Admin
This week has seen car plant closures in Belgium and the UK, consolidation programmes,
including a bail-out for Peugeot and GM/Opel, and a squeeze on the profits of all car
manufacturers, including the relatively healthy VW. Bob Hancké  takes stock of restructuring in
the industry over the last two decades, and finds few reasons to be cheerful.
This is not the f irst t ime that the European car industry is f acing a serious crisis which will
end up in a restructuring wave. In the early 1990s, somewhat drugged by the economic
boom f ollowing German unif ication, car manuf acturers increased capacity signif icantly, by
introducing extra shif ts and constructing new plants. By 1993 it was estimated that surplus capacity in the
industry would grow to 25 per cent by the early 2000s. Faced with that prospect, the large car companies
closed several plants in the mid-1990s: Renault-Vilvoorde, near Brussels, made the headlines all over
Europe, but the company’s f actory in Portugal f aced the same f ate, and in quite a f ew plants production
capacity was at an almost symbolic level, keeping only a f ew hundred instead of  a f ew thousand staf f . Opel
sharply reduced capacity in its Belgian and UK plants. A f ew years later the Volkswagen plant in Brussels
closed down, GM-Antwerp closed shop and now Ford-Genk.
There are two interesting things going on here. One is the
unmistakable demise of  Belgium’s car industry. Only a generation ago,
Belgium produced more cars per head than any other country in the
world, in f ive large plants (Ford, VW, Opel, Volvo and Renault all had
operations in the country’s) with a combined output of  about 1.5
million cars. By the end of  2014, only Volvo will have a working
assembly plant lef t. The workf orce in the Belgian car industry f ell, in
these two and a half  decades until 2014, f rom about 40,000 in the car
f actories (and about the same in the local supply industry) to less
than 15,000, including suppliers. Belgium, dubbed the Detroit of
Europe in the early 1990s, will soon produce almost no cars anymore.
In its place, new f actories and restructured brownf ield sites emerged
in Central Europe: the events in Berlin, Prague and Budapest in 1989
sealed the industry’s f ate in Belgium. The combination of  relatively
low wages, relatively high skills and rapidly increasing productivity was
unbeatable.
The other is the proverbial dog that did not bark. Wages, skills and
productivity in car plants in Germany are at almost exactly the same
levels as in Belgium. In f act, the attempts at wage co-ordination by
the European Metalworkers Federation assured that wages, adjusted f or the level of  productivity (but that
has converged over the last two decades as a result of  corporate restructuring), moved in tandem.
Germany, however, has yet to witness its f irst plant closure. The reason is that, in the end, in the
automotive industry, economics is only one of  several things that matter in deciding where to produce what.
German labour unions have a considerably more secure polit ical posit ion in the country’s car industry than
unions elsewhere, and they are not af raid to use that to make sure that sharp reductions in capacity are
concentrated outside the country and that the German workf orce is shielded f rom competit ion emanating
f rom plants east and west. That was what happened in the 1990s, when IG Metall was involved in
negotiating collective agreements in which they conceded wage dif f erentials and working time systems that
would have been deemed non-negotiable only a f ew years earlier. Today, with the German automobile
industry buoyant again, but with the need f or restructuring nonetheless obvious to all, cuts will again be
made outside Germany. Since the newer, highly productive plants in Central Europe are untouchable, the
axe must f all elsewhere.
This is undoubtedly not the last bit of  bad news that we will hear f rom the European car industry, neither
this year nor in the more distant f uture. The sector suf f ers not f rom bad perf ormance so much as f rom
excessive f ragmentation. There are still six mass producers and three more or less independent luxury car
producers on the continent. The US has two lef t, Japan three, and the rest of  the world another two
combined. More weeding out is theref ore almost impossible to avoid. The management dogma in the
industry is that, more than ever, size matters — hence the move by tradit ional German luxury producers
such as Mercedes and BMW into all car market segments, large and small. And hence also the takeovers
and joint ventures that companies such as VW, Renault, Peugeot and GM have pursued. If  you’re working in
the car industry, f asten your seat belts. It ’s going to be a rough ride.
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